This paper introduces habit-forming preferences in a Barro-type endogenous growth model with productive public services. Government expenditure, which may be subject to congestion, is financed by distortionary income taxation. Different from the standard time-separable model, the presence of habits makes the economy feature transitional dynamics, which are solved in closed form. Setting the income tax so as to equate the elasticity of public services in production is shown to maximize both long-run growth and welfare as in the standard model. This second-best solution coincides with the first-best outcome only in the presence of proportional congestion.
Introduction
Following the seminal work of Barro 1 , the effect of productive government expenditure has been the subject of active research in the theoretical literature on endogenous growth see, e.g., Irmen and Kuehnel 2 , for a recent survey . This interest has been stimulated by empirical work, starting from Aschauer 3 , providing compelling evidence that productive public spending has a positive impact on growth see, e.g., the review by Romp and de Haan 4 .
Barro 1 introduces the flow of government expenditure, which is fully financed by a distortionary income tax, as a productive input to private production. Another strand of the literature, starting from Futagami et al. 5 , considers that it is the accumulated stock of public capital, rather than the flow of current expenditure, that enters in the production function see, e.g., Irmen and Kuehnel 2 . Thus, public policy has two opposite effects on growth, which offset each other if the tax rate on income is equal to the elasticity of public spending in production. Under Cobb-Douglas technology, this growth-maximizing tax rate also maximizes intertemporal utility in a second-best sense. The ensuing literature simulations can be performed without error. Second, we find that the results obtained by Barro 1 are robust to the inclusion of habit formation and, consequently, to the existence of transition dynamics. On one hand, within a decentralized economy set-up, the growthmaximizing and welfare-maximizing in a second-best sense income tax rates coincide, and are equal to the elasticity of public spending in production. On the other hand, in a first-best setting, the optimal ratio of government expenditure to output is equal to the elasticity of public services in production. Furthermore, the first-best solution can be decentralized as a market equilibrium only in the presence of proportional congestion, when the second-best outcome coincides with the first-best solution. In any other case, the first-best solution cannot be decentralized. The numerical results illustrate the implications for the dynamics of the economy of the introduction of habit formation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium dynamics of a decentralized economy. Section 4 studies the firstbest solution attainable by a social planner. Some numerical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We study a closed economy populated by a large but fixed number N of identical infinitelylived individuals, each of whom has an infinite planning horizon and possesses perfect foresight. Each individual is the owner of a unique firm that produces the single output in the economy, which can be devoted to consumption or investment. The government provides productive services to firms, which are financed by an income tax. With all agents being identical, aggregate private quantities are simply multiples of individual quantities. We will denote individual quantities by lower case letters and aggregate quantities by corresponding upper case letters, so that X Nx.
Preferences
The intertemporal utility derived by the agent depends both on its current consumption, c t , and a reference consumption level or habits stock, h t , according to
where u is the instantaneous utility function, and β is the time discount rate. Another commonly-used specification is the "multiplicative" one e.g., 48-51 , in which habitsadjusted consumption is defined as the geometric mean of absolute consumption and relative consumption as a ratio, z t c 1−γ t c t /h t γ . The habits-adjusted consumption, z t ≡ c t − γh t , can be rewritten as z t 1 − γ c t γ c t − h t . Hence, the parameter γ reflects the importance of absolute versus relative-to-habits consumption in utility: the higher γ, the greater the importance of relative consumption. The case γ 0 corresponds to the standard timeseparable model in which only the absolute level of consumption matters. We will assume that the instantaneous utility function u is twice differentiable, with u z > 0 and u z < 0 for all z > 0, and that u is homogeneous of degree −ε < 0. Therefore, the utility function is isoelastic. This last assumption is imposed for guaranteeing the existence of a balanced growth path see, e.g., Acemoglu 52 and Alonso-Carrera et al. 53 . We also assume that u satisfies standard Inada conditions, lim z → 0 u z ∞ and lim z → ∞ u z 0. Following Gómez 54 , the habits stock evolves according to
where c t denotes the economy-wide average level of consumption. The parameter ρ, which governs the speed with which the habits stock adjusts to previous-period consumption, determines the relative weight of consumption at different dates: the larger ρ, the more important is agent's consumption in the recent past and the smaller is the importance of the old values of the habits stock. If ρ 1, then h t 1 m c t , c t , so that the habits stock depends only on previous-period consumption. Note that if ρ 0, then h t h 0 for all t, so that the stock of habits would remain constant at its initial value and would not depend on past consumption levels.
In the internal-habits model, the reference consumption stock depends only on individual's own past consumption, so that m c t , c t c t . In the external-habits model, habits are formed only from average past consumption in the economy, so that m c t , c t c t . Thus, in this case average past consumption, which is taken as given by the individual agent, exerts an external effect in utility. In the hybrid internal-external case, the habits stock is determined by both its own consumption and the economy-wide average level of consumption, which are combined by means of a continuously differentiable homogeneous mean. Most of the literature has considered that habits are formed in an external or internal way, and the papers that introduce hybrid internal-external habits use a weighted geometric mean or to a much lesser extent a weighted arithmetic mean. All of them are encompassed by the specification assumed which, therefore, is fairly general.
Production
At each moment of time, the representative agent is endowed with a fixed and constant stock of labor, l t l. Each individual firm produces output, y t , using the inelastically supplied labor input l t l, the capital stock k t , and public services provided by the government, P t , in accordance with the Cobb-Douglas production function:
where
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Following Turnovsky 6, 55 , the services derived by the agent from public investment are represented by
where K t denotes the aggregate capital stock and G t denotes the aggregate public expenditure. The former formulation incorporates the potential for public investment to be associated with relative congestion. The case σ 1, so that P t G t , corresponds to a nonrival nonexcludable public good that is available equally to each individual firm, independent of the usage of others. Thus, there is no congestion. However, as Barro and Sala-i-Martin 7 argue, almost all public services are subject to some degree of congestion, so that the pure public good should be viewed as only a benchmark. As σ deviates from 1, the nonexcludable public service losses its nonrival nature, and as this occurs the level of public services enjoyed by the individual firm from a given level of public expenditure is enhanced as his individual capital stock increases relative to the aggregate. In the case σ 0, the public good is like a private good in that, since k t /K t 1/N, the individual receives his proportional share P t G t /N. This case is referred to as proportional relative congestion.
Combining 2.3 and 2.4 , firm's output can be expressed as
2.5
Thus, the productivity of individual capital depends upon the usual elasticity of private capital, α, and a component, 1 − σ 1 − α , which reflects the fact that, from the perspective of the individual agent, increasing her stock of capital will increase the level of government services she derives in the presence of relative congestion. Note that the presence of congestion introduces a distortion because the individual firm takes aggregate capital K t as given in her production function 2.5 . However, a central planner would take into account that K t Nk t .
Government
The government levies a tax on income at a constant rate τ. Tax revenues are used to finance productive public expenditure,
so that the government runs a balanced budget. In particular, this means that lump-sum taxes or transfers are not available.
Individual's Optimization
Output can be used for consumption or investment. Thus, the agent's budget constraint is
At time t 0, the agent chooses {c t , k t 1 , h t 1 } ∞ t 0 to maximize the lifetime utility 2.1 subject to the budget constraint 2.7 -where y t is given by 2.5 -and the constraint on the habits stock accumulation 2.2 , taking as given the paths of economy-wide average consumption, {c t } ∞ t 0 , public expenditure, {G t } ∞ t 0 , and aggregate capital, {K t } ∞ t 0 , the income tax rate, τ, and the initial conditions on capital k 0 > 0 and habits stock h 0 > 0.
To derive the optimization conditions, let us set up the Lagrangian of the agent's maximization problem, 
together with the transversality condition
Equation 2.9 equates the marginal utility of consumption, adjusted by its effect on the future stock of habits, to the shadow price of capital. Equation 2.10 equates the rate of return on capital to the rate of return on consumption. From 2.11 and 2.12 , we get
This condition states that the shadow cost of the habits stock is determined as the present discounted value of the stream of extra utils that would be lost by a marginal unit of habits, which depreciates at the rate ρ. Note that 2.13 entails that the shadow value of the habits stock is negative, μ t < 0.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy is as a set of paths {c t , k t 1 , h t 1 } ∞ t 0 that solves the agent's utility maximization problem when c t c t and K t Nk t for all t, and such that the government obeys its budget constraint.
Dynamics in the Aggregate Economy
We will focus on the equilibrium dynamics of aggregate variables, C t Nc t , K t Nk t , and H t NH t . Furthermore, let Z t ≡ C t − γH t Nz t denote the aggregate habit-adjusted consumption, and q t ≡ μ t /λ t the relative shadow cost of habits. Note first that, using the government budget constraint 2.6 to substitute for G t in the production function 2.5 , individual output, y t , and aggregate output, Y t Ny t , can be expressed as
Along a balanced growth path BGP , C t , H t , K t , and therefore Z t , all grow at the same constant rate g. Appendix A derives the following system, which drives the dynamics of the economy in terms of the variables
and q t ≡ μ t /λ t , which are constant along a BGP:
The following proposition, which is proved in Appendix B, yields a closed-form expression for the equilibrium dynamics of the decentralized economy.
Proposition 3.1. The decentralized economy has a unique feasible equilibrium with positive long-run growth which is described by
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and the long-run growth rate is
.14 if and only if parameter values and initial conditions are that
The equilibrium paths of aggregate consumption, capital, and habits stock are then given by C t C t 1 g t , K t K t 1 g t , and H t H t 1 g t . Note, in particular, that the initial value of consumption is given by C 0 C 0 Z ∞ γH 0 . One important consequence of Proposition 3.1 is that the equilibrium dynamics of the economy is invariant to the specific homogeneous mean m chosen; that is, to the implied value of φ. Hence, the dynamics are invariant to whether habits are internally or externally formed and, therefore, the presence of externalities associated to past consumption in the external-habits model does not provoke equilibrium inefficiency. This theoretical finding seems to accord with empirical evidence supporting the habit-formation hypothesis but inconclusive about whether habits are formed in an internal or external way.
If H 0 H 0 > H ∞ , from 3.7 -3.12 in Proposition 3.1, we can find that
Furthermore, as the economy evolves, H t , C t , and K t decrease monotonically toward their respective steady-state values. Intuitively, to maintain a flat pattern of detrended adjustedconsumption, given the relatively high level of the habits stock with respect to its stationary Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 9 value , the agent starts with a relatively high level of consumption, C t , and a low level of investment. Therefore, the capital stock, K t , decreases. As the economy evolves, in order to drive the de-trended habits stock to its long-run level, consumption decreases steadily towards its stationary value. These results should be reversed in the case that H 0 H 0 < H ∞ . The explicit expressions derived in Proposition 3.1 allow us, for example, to compute analytically the speed of convergence towards the balanced growth path. Adapting the measure proposed by Eicher and Turnovsky 56 see also Papageorgiou and Perez-sebastian 57 , the speed of convergence of a variable x t is defined as
where x ∞,t is the equilibrium balanced growth path, which may or may not be stationary. In particular, if x t converges to a constant stationary value, then x ∞,t 1 x ∞,t x ∞ . If γ / 0, the convergence speed of the aggregate variables, H, K and C, is given by Φ ρ 1 − γ . Hence, the convergence speed is increasing in the speed of adjustment of habits to consumption, ρ, and decreasing in the strength of habits in utility, γ. If γ 0, we recover the standard timeseparable Barro 1 model. As it is wellknown, in this case the adjustment is instantaneous: at the initial time, consumption jumps to its BGP value, C 0 C ∞ 1 − τ B − g K 0 , and thereafter consumption and capital both increase at the constant rate g.
Second-Best Solution
Among the different competitive equilibria indexed by the value of the income tax rate, τ, this section determines the one that maximizes individual welfare; that is, the second-best outcome.
Using that z t c t − γh t Z ∞ 1 g t /N, the lifetime utility obtained is
Therefore, we are looking for the value of the tax rate on income, τ, that maximizes 3.19 . Using 3.14 , we can obtain that
which can be used to substitute 1 − τ B as a function of g in 3.19 by means of 3.13 , and allows us to express the lifetime utility U as a function of g. Now, we have that
Hence, the first-order condition to maximize the lifetime utility U with respect to τ becomes d g dτ
which yields the familiar result that the optimal income tax is equal to the elasticity of public services in production,
Given that
lifetime utility U is maximized at the income tax rate τ 1−α, which also maximizes long-run growth. This result is similar to that obtained by Barro 1 in the time-separable model. There is a hump-shaped relationship between growth and welfare and the income tax rate or, equivalently, the ratio of public spending to output: long-run growth first increases, reaches its maximum value, and then decreases as the tax rate increases. This shape results from the combination of two opposing forces on the marginal product of capital, which determines long-run growth: the positive effect caused by the increased provision of productive public services, and the negative effect of a higher tax rate needed to finance them. The growth-and welfare-maximizing tax rate on income is equal to the elasticity of public services in goods production.
The Socially-Planned Economy
We now turn to the first-best solution that a benevolent social planner would implement. The planner takes into account that private and aggregate outputs are related by K t Nk t in the production function, and so,
The planner also takes into account that c t c t or, in aggregate terms, Nc t C t , and, therefore, the constraint on the habits stock accumulation becomes
Thus, given the initial conditions on capital, K 0 > 0, and habits stock, H 0 > 0, the planner chooses {C t , G t, K t 1 , H t 1 } ∞ t 0 to maximize the lifetime utility
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where Y t is given by 4.1 , and the constraint on the habits stock accumulation 4.2 .
First-Best Solution
The Lagrangian of the planner's problem is 
where it has been used that u is homogeneous of degree −ε in 4.6 and 4.9 , together with the transversality condition
Let π t ≡ G t /Y t denote the ratio of public expenditure to output. Equation 4.7 yields the standard rule that the optimal ratio of public expenditure to output is the constant elasticity of public services in production,
Substituting 4.11 into 4.1 , we obtain the following expression for aggregate output:
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Let g denote the long-run growth rate, and let q t ≡ μ t /λ t denote the relative shadow cost of habits. Proceeding in a similar manner as in the market economy, taking into account 4.11 , we can derive the system that drives the dynamics of the centralized economy in terms of the variables 
The following proposition, which is proved in Appendix C, yields a closed-form solution for the dynamics of the efficient first-best solution.
Proposition 4.1. The socially-planned economy has a unique feasible optimal solution with positive long-run growth which is described by
where the (constant) ratio of public expenditure to output is
which converges to a BGP given by
4.22
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where 
The efficient paths of aggregate consumption, capital, and habits stock can be easily computed as C t C t 1 g t , K t K t 1 g t , and H t H t 1 g t . In particular, the initial value of consumption is given by C 0 C 0 Z ∞ γH 0 . As in the Barro 1 model, the share of output claimed to finance public services that maximizes welfare is equal to the elasticity of public services in production. The intuition is simple. On one hand, an increase in public expenditure raises the marginal product of capital and this has positive welfare effects. On the other hand, an increase in public expenditure also decreases the amount of output available for consumption. The optimal size of government balances off these two effects.
If γ / 0, the convergence speed of K, C, and H towards their respective BGPs in the socially-planned economy can be easily shown to be constant and equal to the one in the decentralized economy, Φ Φ ρ 1 − γ . The case γ 0 corresponds to the standard timeseparable Barro 1 model, in which the economy displays no transitional dynamics: at the initial time, consumption jumps to its balanced growth path, C 0 C ∞ Z ∞ αB − g K 0 , and thereafter consumption and capital both increase at a constant rate g.
First-Best versus Second-Best Solution
In the second-best solution, the income tax rate is set according to 3.22 at τ 1 − α, and so, B B. Comparing the transition paths of H t , C t , and K t in the market economy given by 3.7 -3.9 when τ τ 1 − α with their counterparts H t , C t , and K t in the centrallyplanned economy given by 4.17 -4.19 , it is immediate to see that they coincide if and only if the long-run growth rates in the market and the centralized economies coincide, g g. Comparing 3.14 with 4.11 , we observe that the optimal and equilibrium long-run growth rates are related through g ≤ g, with equality if and only if σ 0. Thus, the firstbest and the second-best solutions coincide if and only if there is proportional congestion associated to public expenditure. With proportional congestion, σ 0, setting the income tax rate according to 3.22 ensures that the social marginal return to capital, as viewed by the central planner, αB, coincides with the private after-tax return, as viewed by the individual agent, 1 − τ B. Intuitively, the agent ignores the negative externality caused by congestion and overaccumulates capital relative to the optimum. Thus, an income tax can restore efficiency by increasing the effective marginal product of capital, which discourages capital accumulation.
The dynamics of consumption in the first-best and second-best solutions can be easily compared by using the closed-form expressions derived in Propositions 3.1 and 4.1. Comparison of 4.24 and 3.13 when τ τ 1 − α, and so, B B, reveals that
4.28
with equality if and only if g g. Hence, the initial value of consumption in the secondbest solution, C 0 , is greater than that in the centrally-planned economy, C 0 . However, as the optimal long-run growth rate of consumption is higher than the equilibrium one, consumption in the first-best solution eventually catches up the corresponding one in the second-best solution.
Some Numerical Results
This section illustrates the implications for the dynamics of the economy of introducing habits in the Barro 1 model. To this end, we assume that the instantaneous utility function is given by
where ε is the relative risk aversion. The baseline parameterization is shown in Table 1 . The values of the relative risk aversion, ε, and the time discount rate, β, are standard. As usual in AK-type models, the stock of capital, K t , comprises both physical and human capital, which explains the value of α 0.9. The tax rate on income is set at its second-best optimal value. As a benchmark, we assume that there is no congestion, σ 1. Given these parameter values, the value of B is chosen so that the long-run growth rate in the market economy, g, is 2 percent. For example, normalizing N 1, this entails a value of A 0.1832. This calibration yields a plausible share of consumption in output of 72.8 percent. In the baseline, we set the strength of habits in utility to γ 0.9, following empirical work suggesting a value of γ near unity. The value ρ 0.25 is then chosen so as to obtain a realistic rate of convergence, Φ, of 2.5 percent. Notwithstanding, we will illustrate the effect of assuming different values of ρ and γ on the equilibrium dynamics.
We perform an exercise similar to that in Carroll et al. 49 , and consider the effect of a 10 percent unanticipated reduction in the capital stock of an economy that was initially on its balanced growth path. It should be noted that this shock does not affect the long-run growth rate. Figure 1 a Figure 1 b depicts the evolution of the growth rates of aggregate consumption, capital, and habits. At the initial time, the growth rates fall below their common preshock stationary value. Subsequently, they increase monotonically towards their common steady sate. Note that in the standard Barro 1 model, the economy would jump immediately to its new steady state, while the long-run growth rate would keep constant at 2 percent. Figure 2 depicts the growth rate of consumption for different values of ρ and γ. As 3.14 shows, variations of these parameters do not affect the long-run growth rate of the economy. The behaviour of the growth rate of consumption reflects the fact that the convergence speed, Φ ρ 1 − γ , decreases as ρ decreases and/or γ increases. Figure 3 compares the transition dynamics of the growth rates of consumption and capital in the first-best and second-best outcomes. We assume that the economy was initially at the BGP of the decentralized economy, and at time t 0, it experiments a shock that reduces its capital stock a 10 percent. Figure 3 depicts the time paths of the growth rates in the sociallyplanned and the decentralized economies. Note that in the standard time-separable Barro 1 model the adjustment would be instantaneous; that is, the equilibrium growth rates of the market economy would keep constant at their common value g, and the optimal growth rates of the socially-planned economy would jump at the initial time to their new common value, g.
Conclusion
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with habit-persistent preferences and productive public services. Government expenditure, which may be subject to congestion, is financed by an income tax. Unlike the standard time-separable Barro 1 model, the introduction of habit formation makes the model to feature transitional dynamics, which are solved in closed form. As in the Barro 1 model, within a decentralized economy setup, the growth-and welfare-maximizing in a second-best sense , income tax rates coincide and are equal to the elasticity of public services in production. This is also the optimal share of government expenditure on income in a first-best setting. The first-best solution can be decentralized as a market equilibrium only in the presence of proportional congestion.
In this paper, we have considered that it is the current flow of public investment which is productive. Another strand of the literature assumes instead that the accumulated stock, rather than the current flow, is the source of contribution to productive capacity. One interesting extension would be to analyze a model with public capital or with a mix of productive capital and public expenditure. Another valuable extension would be to consider a more general parameterization of technology, such as CES production. These topics will be the subject of future research.
Appendices
A. Derivation of the Dynamic System 3.3 -3.6
Since u is homogeneous of degree −ε, and using the fact that c t c t , 2.9 can be rewritten as 
B. Proof of Proposition 3.1
Firstly, the long-run growth rate 3.14 can be immediately derived from 3.3 , using that q t , and Z t are constant at the BGP. Taking into account the homogeneity of degree −ε of u , the transversality condition 2.12 is equivalent to β 1 g 1−ε < 1, which combined with the requirement of positive growth yields 3.15 . Note that, if g > 0, the transversality condition is automatically satisfied if ε ≥ 1. Equation 3.6 is a linear difference equation that depends solely on q t , which is a jump variable. Its steady state,
